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Over the past 20 years, aggregate measures of global inequality have changed little even 
if significant structural changes have been observed. High growth rates of China and 
India lifted millions out of poverty, while the stagnation in many African countries 
caused them to fall behind. Using the World Bank’s LINKAGE global general 
equilibrium model and the newly developed Global Income Distribution Dynamics 
(GIDD) tool, this paper assesses the distribution and poverty effects of a scenario where 
these trends continue in the future. Even by anticipating a deceleration, growth in China 
and India is a key force behind the expected convergence of per capita incomes at the 
global level. Millions of Chinese and Indian consumers will enter into a rapidly 
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emerging global middle class—a group of people who can afford, and demand access 
to, the standards of living previously reserved mainly for the residents of developed 
countries. Notwithstanding these positive developments, fast growth is often 
characterized by high urbanization and growing demand for skills, both of which result 
in a widening of income distribution within countries. These opposing distributional 
effects highlight the importance of analysing global disparities by taking into account—
as the GIDD does—income dynamics between and within countries. 
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1 Introduction 
In 1980, China and India accounted for 2 per cent of global output, and the remaining 
low- and middle-income countries made up 16 per cent of world GDP. By 2005, the 
contribution of China and India nearly quadrupled to 7 per cent of global production, 
while the share of other developing countries declined to 15 per cent. The growing 
importance of developing economies can thus be largely explained by the economic 
expansion of China and India. In the future, the increasing level of China and India’s 
integration with the global economy, combined with sustained high growth, is likely to 
further cement their position as an important engine of global development. 
This paper explores the potential consequences of sustained economic expansion in 
China and India by considering the effects the two emerging giants are likely to have on 
global trade, structure of production, and the distribution of income. While growth rates 
in China and India are likely to decelerate in the future, their growth path will still 
outperform growth outcomes of most other countries. Not only are these developments 
likely to drive convergence of per capita incomes at the global level; they are also a key 
force behind the expected entrance of millions of Chinese and Indian consumers into the 
global middle class—a group of people who can afford, and demand access to, the 
standards of living previously reserved mainly for the residents of developed countries. 
Growing demand for goods is likely to boost trade in manufactured products but also 
raise demand for highly skilled workers. This implies that the rules of the global 
marketplace will be increasingly determined by the preferences of citizens of China and 
India, and pressures for policies favouring global integration are thus likely to increase 
in the future. 
An outstanding growth performance of relatively poor and highly populated countries 
like China and India signifies a reduction in the number of poor around the world and a 
decline in global income disparities. Nevertheless, as it is shown by Chaudhuri and 
Ravallion (2006), fast growth in China and India is characterized by high urbanization 
rates and growing demand for skills, both of which resulted in deteriorations in the 
distribution of income within these countries. These apparently opposing distributional 
effects highlight the importance of analysing global disparities taking into account 
income differences not only between national states but also within them. The definition 
of global income distribution used in this study captures income differences between all 
the citizens in the world; we may think of the resulting global inequality as showing the 
income differences that would prevail if the world was seen as a single country. The 
concept of global income distribution becomes increasingly relevant as people’s 
perception regarding their relative position in society is no longer based solely on a 
national yardstick, but is influenced by the increased awareness of living standards of 
people around the world (Milanovic 2006). On the other hand, within-country 
distributional changes should not be disregarded since economic policy is still decided 
and implemented at the national level.  
The empirical results of this paper are produced with the World Bank’s LINKAGE 
global general equilibrium model and the newly developed Global Income Distribution 
Dynamics (GIDD) tool. GIDD is a framework for ex ante analyses of the distribution 
and poverty effects of changes in macroeconomic policy and/or trends in global 
markets. It complements a global computable general equilibrium (CGE) analysis with 
global microsimulations based on standardized household surveys. The tool pools most 
of the currently available household surveys covering 1.2 million households in 63 2 
developing countries; household information from developed countries comes from the 
Luxemburg Income Study dataset. These micro data are complemented with more 
aggregate information for countries where no surveys are available; the final dataset 
covers 91 per cent of the world’s population (see Annex 1 for details). 
The paper is organized as follows. The next section sketches the methodology, 
assumptions, and data behind the GIDD. Section 3 presents the macroeconomic results 
of the baseline scenario, showing the importance of China and India for global growth 
and trade. Section 4 assesses the importance of growth in China and India for the 
changes in the global income distribution and the emergence of a global middle class. 
The final section offers concluding remarks.  
2 Methodology 
The empirical analysis in this paper relies on two tools developed at the Development 
Economic Prospects Group of the World Bank: the LINKAGE global CGE model and 
the GIDD, which combines a consistent set of price and volume changes from the CGE 
model with expected changes in demographic structure to create a hypothetical 
distribution of income in 2030. We begin with a brief description of the LINKAGE 
model and then proceed to introduce the GIDD framework and its ability to map 
macroeconomic outcomes to disaggregated household survey data. 
2.1  LINKAGE: a global dynamic multi-sectoral model 
The forward-looking scenarios in this paper have been produced with the World Bank’s 
LINKAGE model. At its core, LINKAGE is essentially a neo-classical growth model, 
with aggregate growth predicated on assumptions regarding the growth of the labour 
force, savings/investment decisions (and therefore capital accumulation) and 
productivity. Unlike more simple growth models, however, LINKAGE has considerably 
more structure (see van der Mensbrugghe 2005, for a detailed description). First, it is 
multi-sectoral. This allows for more complex productivity dynamics including 
differentiating productivity growth between agriculture, manufacturing and services, 
and picking up the changing structure of demand (and therefore output) as growth in 
incomes leads to a relative shift into manufactures and services. Second, it is linked 
multi-regionally allowing for the influence of openness—via trade and finance—on 
domestic variables such as output and wages. Third, the LINKAGE model has a more 
diverse set of productive factors including land and natural resources (in the fossil fuel 
sectors), and labour is split between unskilled and skilled categories. 
The LINKAGE model has a 2001 base year and relies on the Global Trade Analysis 
Project (GTAP) 6.1 database1 to calibrate initial parameters. A scenario is developed by 
solving for a new equilibrium in each subsequent year through 2030. The growth in the 
labour force is driven by demographics—essentially given by the growth of the working 
age population. Differentiated growth of skilled versus unskilled workers is partly 
driven by demographics and partly driven by changes in education rates. As education 
                                                 
1   See www.gtap.org for details. 3 
levels rise (in the younger populations), they eventually increase relative growth of 
skilled workers once they enter the labour force (and older unskilled workers retire). 
Savings decisions are partly driven by demographics—rising as youth dependency 
ratios fall and falling as elderly dependency ratios rise. Investment rates are driven by 
changes in growth rates (the accelerator mechanism) and differential rates of return to 
capital. Net foreign savings is the difference between domestic savings and investment. 
Productivity is derived by a combination of factors, but is also partially judgemental. 
First, agricultural productivity is assumed to be factor-neutral and exogenous and is set 
to estimates from empirical studies. Productivity in manufacturing and services is 
labour-augmenting and a constant wedge is imposed between productivity growth in the 
two broad sectors with the assumption that productivity growth is higher in 
manufacturing than in services. Finally, the model assumes that energy efficiency 
improves autonomously by 1 per cent per year in all regions and that international trade 
costs also decline by 1 per cent per year. 
2.2  GIDD: linking macroeconomic outcomes to micro survey data 
The GIDD framework is based on micro-simulation methodologies developed in the 
recent literature, including  Bourguignon and Pereira da Silva (2003); Ferreira and 
Leite (2003, 2004); Chen and Ravallion (2003); and Bussolo, Lay and van der 
Mensbrugghe (2006). The starting point is the global income distribution in 2000, 
assembled using data from household surveys for 84 countries and data on income 
groups (usually vintiles) for the remaining countries; the final sample covers 91 per cent 
of the world population (see Annex for a full detailed list).2 The hypothetical 2030 
distribution is then obtained by applying three main exogenous changes to the initial 
distribution: (i) demographic changes, including aging and shifts in the skill 
composition of the population; (ii) shifts in the sectoral composition of employment; 
and (iii) economic growth, including changes in relative wages across skills and sectors.  
The empirical framework is depicted in Figure 1. Our simulations will include the 
expected changes in the shares of population by groups formed by age and education 
characteristics (top boxes of Figure 1). The future changes in population shares by age 
(upper left part of Figure 1) are taken as exogenous from the population projections 
provided by the World Bank’s Development Data Group. Therefore, we assume that 
fertility decisions and mortality rates are determined outside the model. The change in 
shares of the population by education groups incorporates the expected demographic 
changes (linking arrow from top left box to top right box in Figure 1). Next, new sets of 
population shares by age and education subgroups are computed and household 
sampling weights are rescaled according to the demographic and educational changes 
above (larger box in the middle of Figure 1). In a second step, the demographic changes 
will impact overall labour supply by age and skill groups. These changes are 
incorporated into the CGE model to simulate overall economic growth, growth in 
relative incomes by education groups and sector reallocation of labour (link between the 
middle and bottom rectangles). Finally, the results of the CGE are passed-on to the  
re-weighted household survey (bottom link in Figure 1). 
                                                 
2   Throughout the paper, when we talk about the global distribution, we are indeed referring to the 
GIDD’s sample covering 91 per cent of the world population.   4 
Figure 1  
GIDD methodological framework 
In reality these changes take place simultaneously, but in the GIDD’s simplified 
framework they are accommodated in a sequential fashion. In the first step, total 
population in each country is expanded until it reaches the World Bank’s projections for 
2030. The structure of the population is also changed; for example, as fertility rates 
decrease and life expectancy increases, older age cohorts will become larger in many 
countries. To accommodate these changes in the survey data, larger weights have been 
assigned to older people than those assigned to younger individuals.3 In the next step, 
workers move from traditional agricultural sectors to more dynamic industrial and 
service sectors, and new incomes are estimated for these movers. Finally, consistent 
with an overall growth rate of real income per capita, changes in labour remuneration by 
skill level and sector are applied to each worker in the sample depending on their 
education and sector of employment. The number of workers changing sector of 
occupation and the growth differential in labour remuneration which are used to ‘shock’ 
the micro-data are consistent with the results of the global computable general 
                                                 
3   Actually weights are not changed for each single individual but for whole households. Therefore, in 
the example in the text, households whose heads are older are assigned larger weights than households 
with younger heads. For a complete technical description of this re-weighting procedure, which in 
addition to the age structure also involves education attainments, see Bussolo, De Hoyos and 
Medvedev (2007).  
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  5 
equilibrium (CGE) model described in the previous section. (Note that the outcomes of 
the CGE model are also influenced by the same demographic changes described above.) 
The sequential changes described above reshape national income distribution under a 
set of strong assumptions. In particular, income inequality within population subgroups 
formed by age, skills, and sector of employment is assumed to be constant over the 
period. Moreover, data limitations affect estimates of the initial inequality and its 
evolution. Although consumption expenditure is a more reliable welfare measure than 
income, and its distribution is normally more equal than the distribution of income, 
consumption data are not available for all countries’ surveys. To get a global picture, the 
present study had to include countries for which only income data were available. 
Finally, measurement errors implicit in purchasing power parity exchange rates, which  
have been used to convert local currency units, also affect comparability across 
countries. 
The resulting income distribution should thus not be seen as a forecast of what the 
future distribution might look like; instead it should be interpreted as the result of an 
exercise that captures the ceteris paribus distributional effect of demographic, sectoral, 
and economic changes. 
3  The world economy in 2030 
3.1  Developing countries will grow faster due to favourable demographic 
and productivity trends  
Under the baseline scenario of this paper, global GDP grows at an average annual rate 
of 2.9 per cent between 2005 and 2030.4 Measured at constant 2001 prices the global 
economy would reach US$75 trillion in 2030 up from US$35 trillion in 2005, an overall 
increase of some 2.1 times (Figure 2). The developing-country GDP would jump from 
US$8 trillion to US$24.3 trillion, increasing its global share of output from 23 per cent 
to 33 per cent.5 
The accelerated growth path of many developing countries is a consequence, in the 
authors’ judgement, of the combination of improved initial conditions, better policies, 
demographic trends, and the still wide gap in productivity—relative to high-income 
countries. The influence of these factors on growth is already visible in the recent 
performance. If one decomposes the last 25 years in two periods—1980-2000 and 
2000-05—average growth in developing countries jumped from 3.2 per cent per year in 
the first period to 5 per cent per year in the second. Over time, China and India played a 
major role in the quickening pace of growth in the developing world: the contribution of 
the two giants to growth of low- and middle-income countries has increased from 45 per 
cent in the first period to 50 per cent in the second (Figure 3).  
                                                 
4   This represents a modest acceleration of what was observed between 1980 and 2005. For high-income 
countries, projected growth rates decrease slightly (from 2.0 to 1.9) but a more significant acceleration 
is attributed to developing countries (from 2.4 to 3.1).  
5   Evaluated at 2001 market exchange rates and constant prices. The rapidly emerging economies would 
normally be associated with rising real exchange rates so that their weight in the global economy will 
actually be measurably higher in value terms than in constant price volume terms. 6 
Figure 2 
Developing countries will account for a larger portion of world output in the coming decade 
 
Figure 3  
Share of developing countries to global output has increased, 
 with China and India playing a major role 
 
Source:   World Bank simulation using the LINKAGE model. 
 
The baseline scenario envisions a slight slowing of this recent performance: over the 
next 24 years, China and India are likely to account for 18 per cent of growth in global 
output and 46 per cent of growth in real output of today’s low- and high-middle 
countries. 
Given their importance in explaining the projected growth rates, demographic and 
productivity future trends deserve some further consideration. Assumptions about 
technological changes and the ensuing productivity growth are subject to a wide band of 
possibilities. There is no agreement on how to interpret recent productivity growth, let 
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alone how to anticipate future patterns. The macro assumptions on productivity built 
into the forecast are largely consistent with the estimates of total factor productivity 
(TFP) growth from the literature (see, for example, Bosworth and Collins 2003). The 
world saw a period of very rapid TFP growth in the 1960s, followed by a decade of 
stagnation coinciding with the energy crisis of the 1970s, recovery to an estimated rate 
of 0.8 per cent per year in the 1980s and 1990s, and an acceleration in the 2000s. There 
have been large variations across regions. The central scenario assumes a long-term rate 
of TFP growth in the range of 1.0-1.4 for the high-income countries, somewhat on the 
high end of the Bosworth and Collins estimates. The range for developing countries is 
somewhat wider—between 0.7 and 2.9 toward 2015 and declining slowly thereafter as 
the positive impacts of rural-to-urban migration fade.  
TFP improvements are modelled as labour-augmenting productivity (Harrod-neutral 
technical change), which is skill-neutral but sector-biased. Consistent with the existing 
literature, productivity in agriculture expands at an average annual rate of 2.5 per cent in 
all countries. Improvements in labour productivity take place at a much faster pace in 
manufacturing, where China and India register annual increases of 15 per cent for 
manufacturing sectors (for comparison, US manufacturing productivity grows at 2.5 per 
cent per year over the same period).  
Two significant demographic changes are occurring at the moment: (i) virtually all of 
the increase in global population will be in developing countries, and (ii) today’s high-
income countries and China will become significantly older. Changing demographics 
weigh heavily on the results influencing the growth of employment, demand trends, and 
changes in savings and investment behaviour (and even productivity). The world will add 
1.5 billion persons to its population between 2005 and 2030—going from (about) 6.5 
billion to 8 billion. Roughly 12 per cent will be living in high-income countries—down 
sharply from the 18 per cent in 1980 and 14.5 per cent in 2005. Due to the differential in 
fertility rates, all but 40 million of this growth in population will occur in developing 
 
Figure 4 
World population growth will be concentrated in developing countries in the coming decades 
 8 
countries. While this represents a substantial increase in the number of persons—with 
concomitant effects on already scarce resources—it also represents a slowing of world 
population growth that added 2 billion persons between 1980 and 2005.  
The largest contribution to the nearly 1.5 billion increase in developing regions can be 
attributed to India, representing 320 million additional persons, and to Sub-Saharan 
Africa excluding Nigeria and South Africa, with a similar increment of 320 million—
each contributing 20 per cent to the global increase. Despite China’s one-child policy 
and overall aging population, the momentum of the current population will generate 170 
million additional Chinese by 2030, another 11 per cent of the global increase. 
This disparity in population trends is also reflected in divergent paths for labour force 
and employment across developing and developed countries. Developed countries’ 
employment growth, though positive through 2010 at about 1.2 million new jobs per 
year, becomes negative thereafter, with an average loss of about 700,000 jobs between 
2010 and 2015, jumping to an annual average loss of over 3.2 million between 2025 and 
2030.6 Labour force growth is still rapid in developing countries—though on a 
declining trend throughout the period. 
For developing countries, aging populations (as defined by the number of elderly per 
100 workers) will rise only slowly from current levels through about 2020, but will start 
accelerating modestly afterwards to reach a level of nearly 19 starting from 12 in 2005. 
This is still well below the developed-country average of 30 today and differs widely 
across regions. China will see a sharper rise in its elderly dependency rate, moving from 
12 currently to 25 by 2030. This could be contrasted with India, which has a level 
similar to China’s at 11, but rising to only 16 by 2030.7  
3.2  Per capita incomes will begin to converge across countries 
Under the growth scenario just described and using PPP exchange rates,8 the speed of 
convergence between developing- and developed-country incomes would be noticeable 
but perhaps not major. At today’s income in PPP terms, the average developing-country 
resident receives about 16 per cent of the average income of high-income countries— 
 
                                                 
6   This latter number represents a decline of about 1 per cent per year. 
7   For developed economies, the standard economic impacts of slowing population growth and aging 
suggest that aggregate savings will decline, all else being equal, as aging populations tend to dis-save 
or consume out of existing assets. This would tend to decrease the amount of savings available for 
developed countries. The evidence for this dis-saving is however mixed. Aging populations can have 
other consequences. Productivity growth could be higher in economies with rapid increases in the 
number of youth joining the labour force. They can also be associated with changes in consumer 
behavior with less demand for food and educational services and more demand for leisure and health 
services (McKibbin 2005; Bryant 2004; Helliwell 2004; Tyers and Shi 2005). There could also be 
fiscal implications as promises to earlier generations in terms of social welfare benefits prove hard to 
finance with a lower tax base. This eventually may involve a combination of lower benefits and delay 
of retirement age or other forms of higher labour force participation rates by the elderly. 
8   Using the market dollar exchange rate of an economy provides a biased estimate of individual 
wellbeing because prices differ substantially across economies—particularly for non-traded goods 
such as personal and housing services. For this reason, it is more appropriate to use the PPP exchange 
rates, which take into account these differences in prices. 9 
Figure 5 
In some developing regions, per capita incomes will begin to converge 




US$4,800 versus US$29,700 (Figure 5). This ratio would rise to 23 per cent in 25 years’ 
time, representing an average developing-country income of US$12,200 versus 
US$54,000 for high-income countries.  
There is great variance across countries. Chinese incomes would rise from 19 per cent 
of the average high income level to 48 per cent (in PPP terms), a significant narrowing 
of the gap and would achieve an average income close to the lower range of today’s 
poorest high-income countries. Per capita incomes in India are likely to rise much more 
slowly—from 11 per cent in 2005 to 17 per cent in 2030—due to faster population 
growth and more measured expansion in real GDP. There would be a further falling 
behind in Sub-Saharan Africa with its modest per capita growth below the high-income 
average, and Latin America would see little if any convergence on average. As the 
previous 25 years have shown, there is plenty of scope for surprises and countries doing 
significantly better, even compared to countries with similar initial conditions. 
The rather modest level of convergence overall, nevertheless, obscures the fact that 
market opportunities for both developed and developing countries will increase 
dramatically as the sheer size of the population of developing countries ensures the 
growth of a very significant middle and upper class likely to rival the purchasing power 
of today’s high income consumer.9 Thus, notwithstanding the challenge that poverty 
will continue to hold on the global community, the wider spread of wealth globally will 
also provide greater means to deal more substantively with poverty and other global 
concerns such as the environment and health.  
                                                 
9   See section 4 for a more detailed discussion of the expanding middle class. 10 
3.3  Accelerated growth and changes in production and trade structure: 
consequences for factor prices  
The previous sections have shown that under baseline conditions, growth in China and 
India will account for a large share of global output. Similarly, as both of the giants are 
already major participants in the global trade arena, the continued expansion of Chinese 
and Indian economies is likely to have far-reaching consequences for world trade. This 
section highlights four main developments: increasing orientation of the giants’ 
economies towards services, growing demand for skilled workers, further improvements 
in competitiveness of manufactured goods, and rising imports of agricultural products 
from high-income countries.  
As average incomes of developing countries converge to OECD levels, demand for 
services in the developing world is likely to increase faster than in high-income countries 
because services tend to have higher income elasticities than agricultural and 
manufactured products. Some of this catch-up will be moderated by growing demand for 
health and public services by the aging OECD populations, but overall, faster growth in 
low and high-middle countries—and particularly China and India—is likely to translate 
into more pronounced shift of production towards service activities (Figure 6).10  
In order to accommodate this growing share of services in total output, the contribution of 
other sectors to aggregate production will decrease. For developing countries, the 
expansion is likely to come at the cost of agricultural output: China’s agricultural output 
share is likely to decrease by more than one-half, while India’s agricultural production 
share could decline by one-third. This is driven by sustained large increases in 
manufacturing productivity in both countries, which underpin their leading growth 
performance. The fast pace of productivity growth in manufacturing sectors allows their 
share of total output to remain roughly constant between 2005 and 2030, despite the 
demand-driven pulling of resources into the service sectors. For the high-income 
countries, the converse is likely to be true. Because productivity in manufacturing among 
OECD countries grows slower, the share of manufacturing in total output declines from 
26 per cent in 2005 to 19 per cent in 2030. 
The changing sectoral structure of Chinese and Indian economies is likely to have 
profound effects on factor returns. Because services tend to be more skill intensive than 
other sectors, increasing demand for services is likely to exert upward pressure on skilled 
wages. In 2005, 79 and 91 per cent of total skilled wage bill in China and India is paid to 
service sector workers, and these shares could rise further by 2030. Demand for skilled 
workers over the coming decades is likely to be particularly acute in China, where slower 
population growth will add to the relative scarcity of the white-collar employees. 
Improvements in education service provision, combined with the fact that younger 
cohorts tend to be better educated than their older colleagues, are likely to lessen some of 
the pressures in the labour market. Nonetheless, our baseline scenario envisions an 
increasing relative scarcity of skilled workers in China and India (as well as most of the 
developing world) and as a result the skill premium is expected to rise (Figure 7). This  
 
                                                 
10  Also see the Annex for additional details. 11 
Figure 6 
Shift into services is more pronounced in China and India 
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Skill premiums are likely to rise across the developing world 
























Developing country exports will be increasingly concentrated in manufactured goods 
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Source for Figures 6, 7 and 8:  World Bank simulation using the LINKAGE model. 12 
widening of wage gaps could lead to increasing inequality within fast-growing 
economies, although such pressures could be counteracted by a host of effects including 
falling rural-urban wage differentials, decrease in the gender wage gap, or changing 
returns to other worker characteristics. 
Productivity growth, changing sectoral structure, and widening skill premiums lead to 
important changes in international competitiveness of developing countries. Low- and 
middle-income nations solidify their comparative advantage in exports of manufactured 
goods, which rise from 79 to 88 per cent of total merchandise exports between 2005 and 
2030 (Figure 8). The trend is even more pronounced in China and India, which benefit 
from a TFP growth significantly above the developing country average. In our scenario, 
97 per cent of Chinese and 98 per cent of Indian merchandise exports are likely to 
originate from manufacturing sectors. As high-income countries lose competitiveness in 
the manufacturing sector due to their lower productivity, the share of manufacturing 
products in their total exports is likely to decline significantly.  
The result that agricultural products become a more important component of high-
income countries’ exports may seem counter-intuitive at first glance. There are two 
main reasons for this development. First, our baseline does not include any significant 
removal of domestic support in agriculture, which allows high income farm producers 
to sell a significant portion of their output on the world markets. Second, as developing 
countries, led by China and India, gain competitiveness in the manufacturing sector, the 
relative price of agricultural products imported from high-income countries declines.  
 
Table 1 
World trade shares, % 
 Agriculture 





turing  Services 
 
Total 
    2005 2030  2005 2030 2005 2030 2005 2030 2005 2030  2005 2030
Export shares                       
China  10  1   11 17  1  0  11 21  1  0    9 16 
India  1 0   1 2  0 0  1 3  1 0   1 2 
East Asia ex. China  4  2    8  12  6  7  6  10  2  0    6  8 
Eastern  Europe  4 1   6 9 13  14  6 8  4 1   6 7 
Latin  America  15 10   12 14  11 13  6  8  3  0    6  7 
Middle  East  1 1   2 1 39  38  3 6  3 1   4 5 
South  Asia  ex.  India  1 1   1 1  0 0  1 1  0 0   0 1 
SSA  3 2   3 3  9  12  1 2  1 0   1 2 
Developing  38 19   43 60  79 84  34 60  15  2   33 48 
High  income  62 81   57 40  21 16  66 40  85 98   67 52 
                     
Import shares                       
China  24  45    1  1 4  12 8  8 5  14    7  11 
India  1 1   1 1  4 6  1 1  1 2   1 1 
East  Asia  ex.  China  4 4   6 6  3 4  4 6  5 8   4 6 
Eastern  Europe  8  11   8 7  9  12  6 6  5 8   6 7 
Latin  America  7 8   6 5  3 3  6 7  6 9   6 7 
Middle  East  6 6   5 7  1 1  4 4  5 8   4 5 
South  Asia  ex.  India  1 0   1 1  0 0  0 1  1 1   0 1 
SSA  2 2   2 2  1 1  1 1  2 4   2 2 
Developing  53 77   30 31  26 39  30 35  30 54   31 40 
High  income  47 23   70 69  74 61  70 65  70 46   69 60 
Source:  World Bank simulation using the LINKAGE model. 13 
This is illustrated in Table 1, which shows global market shares for China and India, as 
well as the standard set of World Bank-defined regions. While China and India’s global 
market shares in exports of manufactured goods double and triple, respectively, their 
significance as exporters in world agricultural markets diminishes even more 
dramatically. Furthermore, while India’s share of global food imports does not change 
appreciably, by 2030 China could account for a large share of total imports of 
agriculture and processed food. It is important to note that the numbers in Table 1 are 
not forecasts, and are predicated on a number of assumptions, including the same rate of 
productivity improvement in farm products across high income and developing 
countries. If, on the other hand, China’s productivity growth in agriculture is able to 
follow the path of its manufacturing productivity more closely, the relative price of 
imported agriculture would rise and limit the country’s willingness to purchase 
agricultural products from abroad.11  
The last two columns of Table 1 show that the exports of low and high-middle countries 
could account for one-half of total global exports by 2030, up from one-third in 2005. 
This expansion is driven to a large extent by the growth in trade originating in China 
and other Asian countries, with the former already the world’s second leading exporter 
in 2005 behind high income European countries. This growing importance of 
developing countries is also reflected in changes in the direction of trade, which is also 
likely to undergo significant shifts over the next 25 years. Figure 9 and Figure 10 show 
that the faster pace of growth in developing countries translates into their rise as 
destinations for Chinese and Indian exports. At the same time, China and India buy 
many more of their manufacturing imports from developing countries, while 
agricultural imports are increasingly sourced from high-income countries (consistent 
with the analysis above). Much of the growing trade dependence between developing 
countries is due to trade in intermediate goods—today, 63 per cent of China’s imports 
are classified as intermediate goods, with roughly half of them coming in the form of 
parts and components. With the increasing orientation of developing countries towards 
manufacturing sectors, these linkages are likely to become even stronger in 2030. 
Figure 9 
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Source:  World Bank simulation using the LINKAGE model. 
                                                 
11  An additional factor influencing the results is the relative land scarcity in China. Over the last decades, 
about 0.7 per cent of arable farm land has been converted to non-agricultural use annually—including 
for roads, factories and residential and business construction. 14 
Figure 10 
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Source:  World Bank simulation using the LINKAGE model. 
3.4  Slower growth in China and India: consequences for the global economy 
The previous sections have argued that the pace of growth in China and India over the 
next 25 years is likely to significantly outpace the growth in the rest of the developing 
world. How would our outlook on the global economy change if instead the two giants 
grew at a rate equal to the developing-country average? In this section, we present an 
illustrative simulation where the 2015-30 TFP growth rate in China and India is set to 
the low and high-middle country average. In addition, foreign saving is kept at baseline 
levels to sterilize the effects of international capital mobility and focus the analysis on 
the spillover effects through international trade. 
In this simulation, China’s 2005-30 real GDP growth declines from 5.8 to 5.2 per cent, 
while that of India is reduced from 4.9 to 4.4 per cent. World GDP growth over the 
same period declines by 0.06 per cent per year; this effect is mostly driven by a reduced 
contribution of the giants to global output (direct effects). The indirect effects—
spillovers to other countries through changing trade patterns and world prices—have 
only minor impacts on real GDP. The main reason for this result is that the growth 
process is determined by accumulation of labour and capital, and TFP improvements. 
Slower growth in China and India does not have an impact on labour force growth or 
capital accumulation in other countries, and affects TFP only marginally through 
reduced openness.12 However, effects on consumption are more pronounced 
(Figure 11). In 2030, global consumption is one per cent lower relative to baseline, 
although most of the decline is accounted by the large losses in China and India. If the 
two giants are removed from the global aggregate, consumption losses are reduced to 
0.2 per cent. In relative terms, consumption in developing countries (excluding China 
and India) and high-income countries declines by the same amount (0.2 per cent), but 
the aggregate losses are much more pronounced in high-income countries where 
consumption in 2030 is lower by US$66 billion. There are two factors responsible for 
fall in global consumption outside of China and India: on the one hand, consumers in 
the rest of the world must now pay higher prices for Chinese and Indian products 
                                                 
12 The model incorporates a feedback mechanism from increases in exports-to-GDP ratio to total factor 
productivity. Slower growth in China and India leads to lower volumes of global trade, which reduces 
the positive productivity spillovers from openness. 15 
(which are produced using less efficient technologies), and on other hand, producers in 
these countries receive lower prices for the products they sell to China and India due to 
reduced global demand. 
Figure 11 
Global consumption declines, and high-income countries lose more 
 
Source:  World Bank simulation using the LINKAGE model. 
4  Global income distribution: China, India and the middle class  
As briefly described in the methodology section, the demographic shifts and economic 
changes simulated with the CGE model are used to ‘shock’ individual household incomes 
and a new counterfactual global income distribution for 2030 is estimated.13 By comparing 
the simulated and the initial global income distributions, one can infer the importance of 
China and India in explaining some of the key changes in the global distribution as the 
reduction of global inequality and the emergence of a global middle class.  
4.1 Global  income  inequality 
If the world were a single country, it would be one of the worst distributed,14 with a 
Gini coefficient of 0.68 (see Table 2), well above the world’s simple average of 0.39 
and the population-weighted average of 0.35. The fact that global inequality is higher 
than the inequality level within most countries is explained by disparities in average 
incomes  between countries. This is also clear from the results of two different 
                                                 
13  It is worth noticing that the results of our model are not a forecast of future income distribution; the 
GIDD creates, within a global CGE-microsimulation framework, a hypothetical income distribution 
accommodating assumptions regarding the future rate of population growth, human capital 
accumulation, sectoral allocation and GDP growth (see Bussolo et al. 2007). 
14  Only Haiti with a Gini coefficient of 0.71 showed more inequality than the world as a whole in 2000.    
Losses in real consumption in 2030 relative to baseline (%)  
-10  -8  -6 -4 -2 0
China
India




South Asia ex. India
SSA
Developing ex. China, India 
High income
World16 
population decomposition15 exercises: (i) defining the subgroups as countries, and   
(ii) defining two subgroups, China and India versus the rest of the world. The results show 
that a measure of international inequality based on country’s average incomes, completely 
ignoring within-country differences in incomes, would capture three-quarters of total 
global inequality in 2000. In other words, eliminating all within-country income 
differences would bring global income inequality down by 25 per cent. In a second 
exercise the world’s population is partitioned in two subgroups, one containing the 
populations of China and India and the other one citizens from the rest of the world. This 
decomposition shows that in 2000 comparing average incomes of the China and India 
group with average income in the rest of the world (RoW) would be enough to capture 18 
per cent of total income inequality (Table 2).  
The importance of China and India gets much larger when considering changes between 
the 2000 and 2030 global distributions. By 2030, the Gini for the global income 
distribution is 5 points lower than its level in 2000. According to the decomposition 
results, the reduction in inequality between 2000 and 2030 is entirely accounted for by a 
reduction in disparities in average incomes across countries. Since reductions in average 
incomes differentials are weighted by population, a rapid growth of poor countries like 
China and India can have a great impact on global inequality. 
As a matter of fact, the decomposition results for China and India versus the rest of the 
world shows that 14 out of a total of 16 points reduction in the Theil index between 2000 
and 2030 are explained by a reduction in inequality in average incomes between the 
China and India group versus the rest of the world (compare the result of 0.17 Theil points 
explained by China and India in 2000 with the 0.03 points for 2030). In other words, 
average income in China and India are closer to the world’s average in 2030 than what 
they were in 2000. 
Table 2  
Subgroup decomposition of the global income inequality 
Global Inequality    Subgroups   
Year  Gini  Theil  Countries  China-India versus RoW 
2000 0.68  0.93 Between  0.69 Between  0.17 
       (0.75)   (0.18) 
     Within  0.23  Within  0.76 
       (0.25)   (0.82) 
            
2030 0.63  0.77 Between  0.54 Between  0.03 
       (0.70)   (0.04) 
     Within  0.23  Within  0.74 
       (0.30)   (0.96) 
Notes:   Decomposition results are based on the Theil index (generalized entropy index with aversion 
parameter equal to 1) decomposition;  Proportion of total income inequality between brackets. 
Source:   Authors’ calculations using the GIDD model. 
                                                 
15   A simple way of evaluating the importance of differences in average incomes between countries 
versus differences in incomes within countries is to undertake inequality decomposition by population 
subgroups. A subgroup decomposition exercise separates or partitions the population (in this case the 
world population) into mutually excusive groups and assesses how much inequality is accounted for 
by difference in incomes between groups versus within these groups (Mookherjee and Shorrocks 
1982). The importance of a particular characteristic determining the partition rule will be captured by 
the proportion of inequality that can be accounted for by differences in average incomes between 
groups (Cowell and Jenkins 1995). 17 
4.2  The emergence of the global middle class 
According to our baseline, in 2030, 16.1 per cent of the world population will belong to 
what can be called a ‘global middle class’, up from 7.6 per cent in 2000. That is, in 2030 
more than a billion people in developing countries will buy cars, engage in international 
tourism, demand world-class products, and require international standards for higher 
education. Compare that with only 250 million people in developing countries who had 
access to these kinds of living standards in 2000. This large middle class will create 
rapidly growing markets for international products and services—and become a new 
force in domestic politics.  
The  global middle class is defined here as in Milanovic and Yitzhaki (2002). The 
authors propose disaggregating the world population into three categories—the poor, 
the middle class, and the rich—where the middle class is defined by two absolute 
thresholds equal to the per capita incomes of Brazil and Italy.16 By assigning an 
individual to the global middle class according to his or her income, Table 3 shows the 
evolution of this income group and contrasts it with the groups of the poor and the 
rich.17 This table also shows that the great majority of the global middle-class entrants 
are citizens of developing countries; hence, tomorrow’s global middle class will be 
formed, primarily, by today’s citizens from poor countries. The total increase in the 
global middle class is explained by (i) population growth rates of cohorts within this 
class that are above the world average, and (ii) by higher economic growth rates in 
developing countries which pull their citizens out of poverty and into the global middle 
class. The population growth rates of households within the global middle class (as 
classified in 2000) was relatively low with an average rate of 18 per cent over the entire 
period, as opposed to the world average of 32 per cent. Therefore, the great majority of 
the increase in the global middle class is explained by high economic growth rates 
taking place in developing countries. 
How much of the expected increase in the global middle class is attributable to the 
economic performance of China and India? Figure 12 divides the global middle class 
into citizens from China, India and the rest of the World (RoW). In 2000 only 13.5 per 
cent of the global middle class were Chinese nationals and no Indians belonged to this 
group.18 By 2030 citizens from China and India had a combined shared of 44 per cent 
of the global middle class, with the great majority (38 per cent) being Chinese, in fact 
half of the total 740 million new entrants into the global middle class will be Chinese 
nationals.   
The importance of China and India in the global middle class will depend on their 
economic and population growth rates and the changes in their within-country income 
inequality. For instance, in China, 56 million people belonged to the global middle class 
                                                 
16  Italy’s per capita income was used as the upper threshold because it was the country with the lowest 
income among the G7; Brazil’s per capita income corresponded to the official poverty line used in 
rich countries like the US and Germany (about PPP $10 per capita per day). 
17  Notice that the definition of poor used here is far from being comparable to the standard $1-a-day 
definition.  
18    It is quite likely that in reality some Indians are within the middle and high income ranges, 
nevertheless by the way the Indian Household Survey data is being collected, outliers (high income 
citizens) are not captured at all.    18 
in 2000—each of them earning more than 90 per cent of all Chinese citizens, i.e., they 
belonged to the richest decile. By 2030, assuming income inequality in China remains 
constant, there will be 361 million Chinese in the global middle class, and their earnings 
will range from the sixth to the ninth decile of the Chinese national income distribution. 
Chinese members of the global middle class will no longer be among the richest 
Chinese citizens but will probably be considered upper middle class in their country. On 
the other hand, if China manages to reduce income disparities, making middle income 
cohorts fatter, they would contribute even further to the global middle class. 
Table 3 
The global middle class is growing, and its composition is changing 
 Shares  Growth  rates 
 2000  2030  (%  2000-2030) 
   Population Income Population Income Population Income 
Poor   82.0  28.7  63.0  17.0    2  29 
Middle class, of which: 7.6  13.8  16.1  14.0    178 0 
Developed-country nationals 3.5  6.8  1.2  1.0    -52 -2 
Developing-country nationals 4.1  7.0  14.6  12.9    363 3 
Rich   10.5  57.5  20.9  69.0    163 28 
Total 100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0    32 109 
Notes:   Totals may not sum to 100 because of rounding; 
         Poor are defined as individuals with an income below the average of Brazil; the middle class was  
defined as individuals with an income between the per capita incomes of Brazil and Italy; rich are 
those individuals with incomes at or above the average income in Italy; 
  Thresholds of Brazil and Italy are annual per capita incomes (2000 PPP) of US$3,914 and 
US$16,746. 
Source:   Authors’ calculations using the GIDD model. 
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To inspect these effects in more detail, in Figure 13 we fit a non-parametric kernel 
income density for China, India and the world population in 2000 and 2030. Figure 13 
consistently shows the proportion of world population to Chinese and Indian 
populations; hence the Chinese and Indian densities can be interpret as the probabilities 
of being within the different income ranges and being Chinese and Indian citizens, 
respectively. Several interesting features are highlighted by Figure 13. In 2000, the 
mode of the global income distribution (1993 PPP $114), i.e., the income value that 









earned by a high proportion of Indian upper middle-class citizens and members of the 
Chinese lower middle-class (overlapping of the Chinese and Indian income densities in 
Figure 13). Focusing on the country-specific distributions, we can see that in 2000 
incomes were less skewed in India compared with China (India’s distribution had a 
larger density around the mean); in 2000, the Gini coefficient for India was equal to 
0.29 compared with a value of 0.42 in China. In fact, due to the relatively unequal 
distribution in China, its richest citizens could be part of the global middle class in 
2000. By year 2030, after several years of growth rates higher than the world average, 
China becomes the country that accounted for more global middle-class members, 
hence reshaping the global distribution. 
Growth in China causes a decrease in the global density around the mode and an 
increase in the probability of being in income ranges above it. Although India will 
experience growth rates in per capita incomes above world average, the differential is 
not large enough to make this country significantly move along the global distribution. 
Nevertheless, given that the thresholds defining the global middle class are absolute 
values, India’s growth also results in an increase in the global middle class. India’s 
entrance into the global middle class is also partly explained by an increase in India’s 
income inequality, expanding the upper tail of its distribution further to the right along 
the global density.19 This increase in income dispersion helps the richest 5 per cent 
Indian citizens enter the global middle class. Growth in China and India and, to a lesser 
extent, changes in their within-country inequality will have as an effect a tremendous 
increase in the global middle class resulting in a substantial improvement in global 
income inequality. 
4.3  The consequences of a growing global middle class 
The ascent of hundreds of millions of Chinese, Indians and nationals from other 
developing countries into the global middle class will produce a large group of people in 
the developing world who can afford, and will demand access to, the standards of living 
that were previously reserved mainly for the residents of high-income countries. This 
may have two major implications: the demand for international goods and services will 
rise, and pressures for policies that favour global integration will increase.  
Much of the effect of the middle-class expansion on the world economy will be realized 
through a changing demand for goods. The fact that the middle class will be growing at 
a much faster rate than the overall population (Table 3) implies that multinational 
enterprises will be able to market their products to a much larger audience in 2030 than 
they do today. Furthermore, the rules of this new global marketplace will be 
increasingly determined by the tastes and preferences of the developing world, 
particularly the desires of consumers in China and, to a lesser extent, India. Therefore, 
while most of the world’s purchasing power will continue to be concentrated in the 
OECD countries, the global economic influence of those countries will vastly diminish. 
By 2030 marketing to the developing world will be a much more important strategy for 
multinationals than it is today. 
                                                 
19  India’s inequality passes from a Gini of 0.29 in 2000 to 0.32 in 2030. 21 
The rise of the global middle class will also affect demand for services. For example, 
given the strong correlation between income and determinants of human capital 
accumulation like health and education levels, the growing middle class is likely to 
demand more and better health and education. Therefore the increased emphasis on 
health and education among the middle class will deepen the human capital stocks 
hence establishing the foundations for continued growth in the developing countries. 
However, the increasing demand for education and health is likely to put pressure on the 
budgets of developing-country governments and will require heightened policy attention 
in the future.   
Today the median voter in most developing countries is unlikely to be a member of the 
global middle class; by 2030 the middle class members in developing countries will 
constitute a significant share of their home population, increasing the likelihood of 
finding the median voter among them. In China, for example, the median and mode 
earner will be members of the global middle class in 2030 (Figure 14). These changes 
are likely to have an impact on the domestic policy arena. Some evidence points to a 
correlation between rising incomes and a shift in demand towards more globalization-
supportive policies. Other policy goals—among them improved transparency, 
intensified anticorruption efforts, and demand for a more open society and cleaner 
environment—are also likely to move to the forefront of the policy agenda with the 
expansion in the size of the middle class.   
 5  Conclusions  
This paper analysed, in an ex ante fashion, the effects that economic expansion in China 
and India will have on global growth and the global income distribution. The results 
under the baseline scenario show that, between 2005 and 2030, global GDP more than 
doubles, with China and India accounting for a significant share (18 per cent) of global 
expansion. In terms of income per capita, in 2005 the average Chinese had an income 
one-fifth of what the average citizen of a high-income country would earn and, by 2030, 
this gap narrows to almost one-half. Due to faster population growth and more 
measured expansion in real GDP, per capita incomes in India are likely to rise much 
more slowly than in China, catching up from one-tenth of average incomes in rich 
countries in 2005 to less than one-sixth in 2030. This strong economic expansion of 
China and India also explains two key features of the evolution of the global income 
distribution in the next 25 years: (i) a reduction of global inequality and (ii) the 
emergence of a large ‘global’ middle class. According to our simulations, 4.3 of the 5 
points reduction of the global Gini are due to the decline in income differences between 
Chinese and Indian citizens and the rest of the world. Besides, China, by itself, will 
account for almost half of the total increase in the ‘global’ middle class (310 million out 
of the total 740 million new entrants). 
These results highlight the fact that aggregate indicators of inequality of the global 
distribution of income depend heavily on changes between countries and much less on 
changes within countries. From a global inequality perspective, this is certainly true in a 
situation where very populous and initially poor countries (China and India) are 
growing at a rate above that of rich countries. In an era of globalization, global 
inequality has become more policy relevant. Through easier international movement 
and communication, citizens in individual countries are more aware of the (economic) 22 
situation in other countries and this enhanced awareness is behind emerging political 
demands (for a more equal global income distribution). Consider for instance the case of 
multilateral trade negotiations. As illustrated by the impasse in the Doha negotiations, 
the progress toward freer trade is currently stymied and will take a major effort among 
the rich and poor countries together to realize even its limited progress. However even 
though changes between countries explain a lot of the change in the aggregate index, a 
lot is also happening within countries. These changes of income distribution at the 
national level are still crucial for domestic policy and growth prospects of individual 
countries. Indeed, one of the main novelties of the GIDD framework consists of its 
modelling of within country income distribution. Although not explicitly analysed here, 
behind the aggregate (global) results reported in the main section of this paper, are 
changes in the distribution of income within all of the 64 countries for which individual 
data are available. In fact, increases of inequality within many countries contrast with 
the reported decrease of the global inequality; however, a thorough analysis of these 
individual countries’ trends is beyond the scope for this paper and more information can 
be found in Bussolo, De Hoyos, and Medvedev (2007) and World Bank (2007).  
References 
Atkinson, A. B., and A. Brandolini (2004). ‘Global World Inequality: Absolute, 
Relative or Intermediate’. Paper prepared for the 28th Conference of the 
International Association for Research in Income and Wealth, 22-28 August. Cork. 
Bosworth, B. P., and S. M. Collins (2003). ‘The Empirics of Growth: An Update’. 
Brookings Paper on Economic Activity, 2: 113-206. 
Bourguignon, F., and C. Morrison (2002). ‘Inequality among World Citizens: 1890-
1992’. American Economic Review, 92 (4): 727-44. 
Bourguignon, F., and L. Pereira da Silva (eds) (2003). The Impact of Economic Policies 
on Poverty and Income Distribution: Evaluation Techniques and Tools. New York: 
Oxford University Press for the World Bank. 
Bussolo, M., J. Lay, and D. van der Mensbrugghe (2006). ‘Structural Change and 
Poverty Reduction in Brazil: The Impact of the Doha Round’. WB Policy Research 
Working Paper 3833. Washington, DC: World Bank. 
Bussolo, M., R. E. De Hoyos, and D. Medvedev (2007). ‘Demographic Change, 
Economic Growth, and Income Distribution: An Empirical Analysis Using ex-ante 
Microsimulations’. Background paper for Global Economic Prospects 2007: 
Confronting Challenges of the Coming Globalization. Washington, DC: World Bank. 
Bryant, R. C. (2004). ‘Cross-Border Macroeconomic Implications of Demographic 
Change’. Brookings Discussion Paper 166. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution. 
Available at: www.brookings.edu/views/papers/200409_bdpie166.pdf 
Chaudhuri, S., and M. Ravallion (2006). ‘Partially Awakened Giants: Uneven Growth 
in China and India’. Washington, DC: World Bank. Mimeo. 
Chen, S., and M. Ravallion (2003). ‘Household Welfare Impacts of China’s Accession 
to the World Trade Organization’. WB Policy Research Working Paper 3040. 
Washington, DC: World Bank. 23 
Cowell F. A., and S. P. Jenkins (1995). ‘How Much Inequality Can We Explain? A 
Methodology and an Application to the United States’. The Economic Journal, 105 
(429): 421-30. 
David, P. A. (1990). ‘The Dynamo and the Computer: An Historical Perspective on the 
Modern Productivity Paradox’. The American Economic Review, 80 (2): 355-62.  
Ferreira, F. H. G., and P. G. Leite (2003). ‘Meeting the Millennium Development Goals 
in Brazil: Can Microsimulations Help?’. Economía, 3 (2): 235-79. 
Ferreira, F. H. G., and P. G. Leite (2004). ‘Educational Expansion and Income 
Distribution: A Microsimulation for Ceará’. In A. Shorrocks and R. van der Hoeven 
(eds), Growth, Inequality and Poverty. Oxford: Oxford University Press for UNU-
WIDER. 
Gordon, R. J. (2000). ‘Does the “New Economy” Measure Up to the Great Inventions of 
the Past?’. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 14 (4): 49-74.  
Helliwell, J. F. 2004. ‘Demographic Changes and International Factor Mobility’. NBER 
Research Working Paper 10945. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic 
Research.  
McKibbin, W. J. (2005). ‘The Global Macroeconomic Consequences of a Demographic 
Transition’. Sydney: Centre for Applied Macroeconomic Analysis, Australian 
National University. Processed.  
Milanovic, B. (2002). ‘True World Income Distribution, 1988 and 1993: First 
Calculation Based on Household Surveys Alone’. Economic Journal, 112 (476): 51-
92. 
Milanovic, B. (2006). ‘Global Income Inequality: What it is and Why it Matters’. WB 
Working Paper Series 3865. Washington, DC: World Bank. 
Milanovic, B., and S. Yitzhaki (2002). ‘Decomposing World Income Distribution: Does 
the World Have a Middle Class?’. Review of Income and Wealth, 48 (2): 155-78. 
Mookherjee, D., and A. Shorrocks (1982). ‘A Decomposition Analysis of the Trend in 
UK Income Inequality’. The Economic Journal, 92 (368): 886-902. 
Quah, D. T. (1996). ‘Twin Peaks: Growth and Convergence in Models of Distribution 
Dynamics’. Economic Journal, 106 (437): 1045-55. 
Tyers, R., and Q. Shi (2005). ‘Global Demographic Change, Labour Force Growth and 
Economic Performance’. Canberra: Faculty of Economics and Commerce, Australian 
National University. Processed. June. 
van der Mensbrugghe, D. (2005). ‘The LINKAGE Model Technical Documentation’. 
Washington, DC: World Bank. 
Winters, L. A., and S. Yusuf (2006). Dancing with Giants: China, India and the Global 
Economy. Washington, DC: World Bank; Singapore: Institute of Policy Studies  
World Bank (2006). Global Economic Prospects 2007: Confronting Challenges of the 
Coming Globalization. New York: Oxford University Press for the World Bank.  24 
Annex: Household surveys 
Region  Covered population  Actual population     
World 5,513,123  6,076,509  90.73   
East Asia and Pacific  1,749,255 1,817,232  96.26   
Eastern Europe and Central Asia 474,468 471,549  100.62   
High Income Countries  767,291  974,612  78.73   
Latin America  503,418  515,069  97.74   
Middle East and North Africa 192,128  276,447  69.50   
South Asia  1,336,922 1,358,294  98.43   
Sub-Saharan Africa  489,642  663,305  73.82   
        
Economy  Covered population  Actual population  Coverage (%)  Data used
East Asia and Pacific  1,749,255 1,817,232  96.26   
China, rural  866,670  866,670  47.69  grouped 
China, urban  407,755  407,755  22.44  grouped 
Indonesia 209,173  206,000  11.34  individual 
Vietnam 78,670  78,500  4.32  individual 
Philippines 76,627  75,800  4.17  grouped 
Thailand 61,439  61,400  3.38  individual 
Malaysia 23,270  23,000  1.27  grouped 
Cambodia 12,744  12,700  0.70  individual 
Lao PDR  5,278  5,279  0.29  grouped 
Papua New Guinea  5,133  5,299  0.29  grouped 
Mongolia, urban  1,576  1,576  0.09  grouped 
Mongolia, rural  921  921  0.05  grouped 
Myanmar   47,700  2.62  missing 
Korea, Dem. Rep.    21,900  1.21  missing 
Fiji   811  0.04  missing 
Timor-Leste   784  0.04  missing 
Solomon Islands    419  0.02  missing 
Vanuatu   191  0.01  missing 
Samoa   177  0.01  missing 
Micronesia, Fed. Sts    107  0.01  missing 
Tonga   100  0.01  missing 
Kiribati   91  0.00  missing 
Marshall Islands    53  0.00  missing 
        
Eastern Europe and Central Asia  470,491  471,549  99.78   
Russian Federation  146,560  146,000  30.96  individual 
Turkey 68,234  67,400  14.29  individual 
Ukraine 49,498  49,200  10.43  grouped 
Poland 38,649  38,500  8.16  individual 
Uzbekistan 24,652  24,700  5.24  grouped 
Romania 22,117  22,400  4.75  individual 
Kazakhstan 15,034  14,900  3.16  individual 
Serbia and Montenegro  10,639  8,137  1.73  grouped 
Czech Rep.  10,275  10,300 2.18  grouped 
Hungary 10,226  10,200  2.16  individual 
Belarus 10,005  10,000  2.12  grouped 
Azerbaijan 8,048  8,049  1.71  grouped 
Bulgaria 7,999  8,060  1.71  individual 
Tajikistan 6,189  6,159  1.31  individual 
Slovak Rep.  5,393 5,389  1.14  grouped 
Georgia 5,261  4,720  1.00  grouped 
Kyrgyz Rep.  4,952  4,915  1.04  individual 
Turkmenistan 4,644  4,502 0.95  grouped 
Croatia 4,446  4,503  0.95  grouped 
Moldova 4,275  4,275  0.91  individual 
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Lithuania 3,499  3,500  0.74  individual 
Armenia 3,082  3,082  0.65  individual 
Albania 3,062  3,062  0.65  individual 
Latvia 2,383  2,372  0.50  grouped 
Estonia 1,373  1,370  0.29  individual 
Bosnia and Herzegovina    3,847  0.82  missing 
Macedonia, FYR    2,010  0.43  missing 
        
High-income countries  764,271 974,612 78.42   
United States  282,223 282,000  28.93  grouped 
Germany 82,211  82,200  8.43  grouped 
France 58,895  58,900  6.04  grouped 
United Kingdom  58,798  59,700  6.13  grouped 
Italy 57,689  56,900  5.84  grouped 
Korea, Rep.  47,008 47,000  4.82  grouped 
Spain 40,498  40,300  4.13  grouped 
Canada 30,771  30,800  3.16  grouped 
Netherlands 15,920  15,900  1.63  grouped 
Greece 10,905  10,900  1.12  grouped 
Belgium 10,254  10,300  1.06  grouped 
Portugal 10,129  10,200  1.05  grouped 
Sweden 8,875  8,869  0.91  grouped 
Austria 8,011  8,012  0.82  grouped 
Hong Kong, China  6,669  6,665  0.68  grouped 
Israel 6,282  6,289  0.65  grouped 
Denmark 5,338  5,337  0.55  grouped 
Finland 5,177  5,176  0.53  grouped 
Norway 4,492  4,491  0.46  grouped 
Singapore 4,020  4,018  0.41  grouped 
New Zealand  3,864  3,858  0.40  grouped 
Ireland 3,815  3,805  0.39  grouped 
Slovenia 1,986  1,989  0.20  grouped 
Luxembourg 441  438  0.04  grouped 
Japan   127,000  13.03  missing 
Taiwan, China    22,200  2.28  missing 
Saudi Arabia    20,700  2.12  missing 
Australia   19,200  1.97  missing 
Switzerland   7,184  0.74  missing 
Puerto Rico    3,816  0.39  missing 
United Arab Emirates    3,247  0.33  missing 
Kuwait   2,190  0.22  missing 
Cyprus   694  0.07  missing 
Bahrain   672  0.07  missing 
Qatar   606  0.06  missing 
Macao, China    444  0.05  missing 
Malta   390  0.04  missing 
Brunei Darussalam    333  0.03  missing 
Bahamas, The    301  0.03  missing 
Iceland   281  0.03  missing 
French Polynesia    236  0.02  missing 
New Caledonia    213  0.02  missing 
Netherlands Antilles    176  0.02  missing 
Guam   155  0.02  missing 
Channel Islands    147  0.02  missing 
Virgin Islands (US)    109  0.01  missing 
Antigua and Barbuda    76  0.01  missing 
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Isle of Man    76  0.01  missing 
Bermuda   62  0.01  missing 
Greenland   56  0.01  missing 
        
Latin America  503,418  515,069  97.74   
Brazil 173,860  174,000  33.78  individual 
Mexico 100,088  98,000  19.03  individual 
Colombia 42,120  42,100  8.17  individual 
Argentina 36,897  36,900  7.16  individual 
Peru 25,953  26,000  5.05  individual 
Venezuela, RB  24,418  24,300  4.72  individual 
Chile 15,412  15,400  2.99  individual 
Ecuador 12,306  12,300  2.39  individual 
Guatemala 11,166  11,200 2.17  individual 
Bolivia 8,318  8,317  1.61  individual 
Dominican Rep.  8,265  8,265  1.60  individual 
Haiti 7,941  7,939  1.54  individual 
Honduras 6,423  6,424  1.25  individual 
El Salvador  6,281  6,280  1.22  individual 
Paraguay 5,468  5,346  1.04  individual 
Nicaragua 4,958  4,920  0.96  individual 
Costa Rica  3,928  3,929  0.76  individual 
Uruguay 3,343  3,342  0.65  individual 
Panama 2,949  2,950  0.57  individual 
Jamaica 2,585  2,589  0.50  grouped 
Guyana 744  744  0.14  individual 
Cuba   11,100  2.16  missing 
Trinidad and Tobago    1,285  0.25  missing 
Suriname   434  0.08  missing 
Barbados   266  0.05  missing 
Belize   250  0.05  missing 
St Lucia    156  0.03  missing 
St Vincent and the Grenadines    116  0.02  missing 
Grenada   101  0.02  missing 
Dominica   71  0.01  missing 
St Kitts and Nevis    44  0.01  missing 
        
Middle East and North Africa 192,128  276,447  69.50   
Egypt, Arab Rep.  67,288  67,300  24.34  individual 
Iran, Islamic Rep.  63,661 63,700  23.04  grouped 
Morocco 28,706  27,800  10.06  grouped 
Yemen, Rep.  17,936  17,900 6.48  individual 
Tunisia 9,565  9,564  3.46  grouped 
Jordan 4,973  4,857  1.76  individual 
Algeria   30,500  11.03  missing 
Iraq   23,200  8.39  missing 
Syrian Arab Rep.    16,800  6.08  missing 
Libya   5,306  1.92  missing 
Lebanon   3,398  1.23  missing 
West Bank and Gaza    2,966  1.07  missing 
Oman   2,442  0.88  missing 
Djibouti   715  0.26  missing 
        
South Asia  1,336,922  1,358,294  98.43   
India 1,021,082  1,020,000 75.09  individual 
Pakistan 142,650  138,000  10.16  individual 
Bangladesh 128,914  129,000  9.50  individual 
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Nepal 24,430  24,400  1.80  individual 
Sri Lanka  19,847  19,400  1.43  individual 
Afghanistan   26,600  1.96  missing 
Bhutan   604  0.04  missing 
Maldives   290  0.02  missing 
        
Sub-Saharan Africa  489,088  663,305  73.73   
Nigeria 117,608  118,000  17.79  individual 
Ethiopia 68,527  64,300  9.69  individual 
South Africa  45,610  44,000 6.63  individual 
Tanzania 34,761  34,800  5.25  individual 
Kenya 30,094  30,700  4.63  grouped 
Uganda 24,309  24,300  3.66  individual 
Ghana 19,593  19,900  3.00  grouped 
Côte d'Ivoire  16,734  16,700  2.52  individual 
Madagascar 16,196  16,200  2.44  individual 
Cameroon 14,855  14,900  2.25  individual 
Zimbabwe 12,649  12,600  1.90  grouped 
Zambia 12,594  10,700  1.61  individual 
Niger 11,781  11,800  1.78  individual 
Burkina Faso  11,291  11,300  1.70  individual 
Senegal 10,342  10,300  1.55  individual 
Malawi 10,308  11,500  1.73  grouped 
Guinea 8,433  8,434  1.27  individual 
Rwanda 8,024  8,025  1.21  individual 
Burundi 6,488  6,486  0.98  individual 
Sierra Leone  4,509  4,509  0.68  individual 
Mauritania 2,643  2,645  0.40  individual 
Lesotho 1,743  1,788  0.27  grouped 
Congo, Dem. Rep.    50,100  7.55  missing 
Sudan   32,900  4.96  missing 
Mozambique   17,900  2.70  missing 
Angola   13,800  2.08  missing 
Mali   11,600  1.75  missing 
Chad   8,216  1.24  missing 
Benin   7,197  1.09  missing 
Somalia   7,012  1.06  missing 
Togo   5,364  0.81  missing 
Central African Rep.    3,777  0.57  missing 
Eritrea   3,557  0.54  missing 
Congo, Rep.    3,438  0.52  missing 
Liberia   3,065  0.46  missing 
Namibia   1,894  0.29  missing 
Botswana   1,754  0.26  missing 
Guinea-Bissau   1,366  0.21  missing 
Gambia, The    1,316  0.20  missing 
Gabon   1,272  0.19  missing 
Mauritius   1,187  0.18  missing 
Swaziland   1,045  0.16  missing 
Comoros   540  0.08  missing 
Cape Verde    451  0.07  missing 
Equatorial Guinea    449  0.07  missing 
São Tomé and Principe    140  0.02  missing 
Seychelles   81  0.01  missing 28 
Table A2 
Structure of production, consumption, exports, and imports (% of total) 
 Agriculture 
 Processed 
foods  Fossil fuels  Manufacturing 
 
Services 
    2005 2030  2005 2030 2005 2030 2005 2030  2005 2030 
Production                        
China  7  3   4  3   1  1   49  46   38  47 
India  17  12   3  2   1  1   29  28   50  57 
East  Asia  ex.  China  9  6   5  4   3  2   42  43   41  44 
Eastern  Europe  10  7   6  5   4  3   33  31   46  54 
Latin  America  8  6   6  5   2  2   27  24   57  63 
Middle  East  8  5   3  2   12  9   19  23   58  61 
South  Asia  ex.  India  21  15   4  3   1  0   26  29   48  52 
Sub-Saharan  Africa  12  9   7  5   6  6   25  23   50  57 
Developing  9  6   5  4   3  2   34  35   48  54 
High  income  3  4   3  3   0  0   26  19   68  74 
Exports                        
China  5  0   3  2   0  0   88  97   4  0 
India  4  2   4  3   0  0   76  92   16  3 
East  Asia  3  2   4  4   4  3   79  90   9  1 
Eastern  Europe  3  1   3  3   10  7   71  86   13  3 
Latin  America  12  8   6  5   7  6   64  80   11  1 
Middle  East  2  1   1  1   40  26   42  70   15  3 
South  Asia  7  6   3  3   1  1   77  88   12  2 
SSA  8  6   5  4   24  22   54  67   10  1 
Developing  5  2   4  3   10  6   71  87   10  2 
High  income  4  7   2  2   1  1   68  57   24  33 
Imports                        
China  15  20   0  0   2  4   71  53   12  23 
India  3  3   2  2   14  14   60  54   20  28 
East  Asia  4  3   4  2   3  2   70  70   20  23 
Eastern  Europe  6  8   4  2   6  5   67  62   17  21 
Latin  America  6  6   3  2   2  2   68  67   21  23 
Middle  East  7  7   4  4   1  1   65  61   23  28 
South  Asia  7  4   4  3   4  3   61  62   23  29 
Sub-Saharan  Africa  6  5   4  3   2  2   58  54   29  36 
Developing  8  10   3  2   3  3   67  61   18  24 
High  income  3  2   3  3   4  4   70  77   19  14 
Private consumption                        
China  28  17   13  9   0  0   23  18   36  55 
India  33  22   7  6   0  0   13  13   46  58 
East  Asia  17  13   12  10   0  0   20  18   51  59 
Eastern  Europe  15  11   12  9   1  1   19  17   53  62 
Latin  America  10  8   11  10   0  0   19  18   61  64 
Middle  East  16  13   9  8   0  0   17  17   58  63 
South  Asia  35  27   10  8   0  0   14  14   42  51 
SSA  21  17   17  15   0  0   17  16   45  52 
Developing  18  14   11  9   0  0   19  17   52  60 
High  income  4  3   6  5   0  0   15  15   75  76 
 
 
 
 